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Abstract
Nowadays E-health cloud systems are more and more widely employed. However the secu-
rity of these systems needs more consideration due to the sensitive health information of
patients. So far, some protocols about secure e-health cloud systems have been proposed,
but many of them use the traditional PKI infrastructure to implement cryptographic
mechanisms, which is cumbersome as they require every user having and remembering
its own public/private keys. Identity based encryption (IBE) is a cryptographic primi-
tive, which uses the identity information of the user (e.g., email address) as the public
key. Hence, the public key is implicitly authenticated and the certificate management
is greatly simplified. On the other hand, proxy re-encryption is a cryptographic primi-
tive aiming at transforming a ciphertext under the delegator A’s into another ciphertext,
which can be decrypted by the delegatee B. In this paper, we describe several identity
related cryptographic techniques for securing an E-health system, which include new IBE
schemes and new identity based proxy re-encryption (IBPRE) schemes. We also prove
these schemes’ security and give their performance analysis. Our results show that our
IBPRE scheme is especially highly eﬃcient for re-encryption, which can be used to achieve
cost-eﬀective cloud usage.
Keywords: Secure e-health cloud system, identity based encryption, identity based
proxy re-encryption, cost-eﬀective.
1. Introduction
E-health System. E-health systems nowadays are becoming more and more commonplace
in medical systems by integrating information technology and traditional medical diag-
nosis processes [23]. Traditionally, when a person has some health troubles, he/she goes
to the hospital to see a doctor. The doctor needs to carefully check patient’s body state
to decide the potential kind of disease or health trouble. In this process, the doctor may
need to handle images, referrals, medical records, etc. which is usually a tedious task.
E-health systems can help handling this work automatically, by means of the health care
information system. For instance, in China, as one typical application of the promising
Internet+ technology, it is expected that in the near future, E-health will be one of
the most practical public administration services. In particular, the Electronic Health
Records (EHR) plays a central role in any E-health system; they can be recorded by
doctors and nursers, collected by sensors in wireless body sensor network, etc. By using
an E-health system, doctors can freely share and exchange health records, while patients
can easily access to their health records through a designated patient’s portal, and the
health care providers can enquire patients’ time-critical and general data eﬀectively and
transparently. Additionally, E-health systems can be beneficial to other users and stake-
holders in the field. Thus, the system stores the patient’s medical history and is a vital
information source for physicians. We can see an overview on a typical E-health system
in Fig. 1. Clinicians record EHRs and related events summary from E-health system
consumers and longitudinal health records. These EHRs can be further supplied to hos-
pitals and other medical providers for deep analysis like lab tests. Health IT vendors
can also better support the hospitals from these health records by dynamically adjusting
their policy. Administers, funders or researchers can also benefit from this process. How-
ever, all these benefits come to the risk of unauthorized data access, data sharing or data
leakage, among other unauthorized patient’s data usage. Indeed, security and privacy
are one of the main issues that prevent to widely adapt E-health systems, for electronic
health records are sensitive information. Malicious attackers can use them to endanger
the patient’s life. Although there are proposals on how to secure the E-health system,
many of them use traditional PKI infrastructure to implement cryptographic mechanisms
and this is not convenient nor practical for many users. In this paper, we show how to
secure E-health systems, mainly using fuzzy biometric E-health system using the identity
based cryptographic techniques, without requiring certificates from the end-user.
Figure 1: Overview of an E-health System.
IBE scheme. In 1984, Shamir [41] introduced the concept of identity-based cryptography
to ease the certificate management in traditional public key system. A user’s public key
in an IBE scheme is the identity information of the user (e.g., email address). Hence the
public key is implicitly authenticated and the certificate management is greatly simplified.
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However, the first practical IBE scheme [8] was only proposed 17 years after its concept
was proposed. Since then, many practical IBE schemes with diﬀerent properties have been
proposed [9, 40, 44, 18].
Until now, there are many interesting applications of IBE, but there is almost no
work on how to apply them to the E-health system. Although we can see some work on
using attribute based encryption (ABE) in the E-health system, but still there is no work
concentrating on how to handle identities directly in these systems. If we can directly
use some string such as the email address as the identity public key, then the workload of
patients can be decreased significantly. We can see an overview on IBE in Fig. 2. In Fig. 2,
Alice encrypted her health information using identity “bob@medical.com” to doctor Bob,
while doctor Bob requests his private key from the CA/PKG.
Figure 2: Overview on IBE scheme.
IBPRE scheme. The concept of proxy re-encryption (PRE) is proposed by Blaze et al. [7]
in 1998, which allows a semi-trusted proxy, with some information (a.k.a., the re-encryption
key), to translate a ciphertext under the delegator’s public key into another ciphertext,
which can be decrypted by the delegatee’s secret key. However, the proxy cannot ac-
cess the plaintext. According to the direction of transformation, PRE schemes can be
classified into bidirectional and unidirectional schemes. Also, according to the times the
transformation can apply to the ciphertext, PRE schemes can be classified into single-hop
and multi-hop schemes. At NDSS’05, Ateniese et al. [1] proposed a few unidirectional
PRE schemes and discussed its several potential applications such as distributed secure
file systems. Later, many unidirectional PRE schemes with diﬀerent properties have been
proposed [24, 50, 43, 38, 14, 49]. Due to the simpler certificate management in IBE, Green
and Ateniese [17] extended PRE to the IBE setting, i.e. identity based proxy re-encryption
(IBPRE). They also discussed its several interesting applications such as bridging IBE and
PKE. Since then, several IBPRE schemes have been proposed [13, 31, 43, 37, 14, 51], but
none of them, except [38, 14], can achieve master secret secure: the corrupted proxy and
delegatee cannot derive the delegator’s private key. However, IBPRE schemes in [38] are
generic constructions relying on CCA-secure 2-level hierarchical ID-based (2,2) threshold
cryptosystem but they are ineﬃcient. IBPRE schemes in [14] rely on conditional proxy
broadcast re-encryption; they are also ineﬃcient and can only achieve secure against re-
playable chosen ciphertext attacks (RCCA). We can see an overview on IBPRE in Fig. 3.
In Fig. 3, a patient encrypts his/her health information using doctor’s identity “Doc-
tor@medical.com” , and outsources the ciphertexts to the cloud. In the setup phase, the
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Doctor has sent the re-encryption key to the proxy, and thus the proxy can re-encrypt
the ciphertexts to be the ciphertexts under the assistant doctor’s identity “AssistantDoc-
tor@medical.com” . By using IBPRE, the assistant doctor shares the patient’s health
information without the cloud knowing about any sensitive information.
Figure 3: Overview on IBPRE
1.1. Our Contribution
In this paper, we show how to securely integrate the IBE and IBPRE schemes into an
E-health cloud system, and thus exploring on how to use identity related cryptographic
techniques for securing an E-health cloud system, especially on the confidential property.
We also propose novel IBE and IBPRE schemes and prove their security. Although there
exist many IBE schemes with diﬀerent properties, however one part of the private key in
all these IBE schemes is of the form: y = f(msk), where msk is the master key and y is an
element in the underlying bilinear group G. We construct a new identity based encryption
scheme. The main novelty of our IBE is that: one part of the private key is y = f(msk),
where msk is the master key and y is an element in ZZ∗p. Here, p is the underlying bilinear
group’s prime order. To resist the adversary to extract useful information on the master
key from this part of the private key, we introduce some randomness in the private key.
We prove this new IBE is IND-sID-CPA secure in the standard model based on a related
DBDH assumption in the bilinear groups. Furthermore, we propose an IBPRE scheme on
this new IBE scheme. This new IBPRE scheme does not follow Green’s paradigm on which
almost all the existing eﬃcient IBPRE schemes are based. The main novelty in this IBPRE
is that, the re-encryption key is almost independent with the delegatee’s private key. As
a result, our IBPRE can achieve master secret security. Finally, we analyse the security
of the proposed E-health cloud system and also show the performance of our IBPRE
scheme, which is the critical part of the whole system. Indeed, our IBPRE scheme has a
unique feature which almost no other IBPRE schemes have, that is, it is very eﬃcient for
re-encryption. Considering that re-encryption is the most often operation cloud systems
implement for secure E-health system, and that this operation must be paid by data users
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or data owners, our IBPRE scheme can be high cost-eﬀective for E-health cloud system
users.
1.2. Related Work
Cryptographic Techniques for Securing E-health systems. Until now there are published
several proposals on how to use cryptographic techniques for securing E-health systems,
including using symmetric key and public key schemes, or pseudo anonymous ID tech-
nique, etc. A common belief on the security of E-health system is that the EHRs should
be encrypted to protect security and privacy. Data, identifiers (pseudonyms), keys and
data attributes (meta-data) are all needed to be encrypted before storing them on the
central authority or outsourcing them to the cloud. Although the centralized facility or
the employees of the cloud service providers are assumed to be prohibited from obtaining
the information about the encrypted PHR, but that assumption could go into detriment
of the whole system’s usability. How to establish the access control properly and to
handle the key management problem eﬀectively is of critical importance. Cryptographic
techniques can also be used to enforce the secure access control mechanism or the key
management properly [27, 28, 20, 33, 34]. Here, we discuss some results closely related to
our proposals. Benaloh et al. [6] discussed how to use encryption for electronic medical
records to ensure privacy by a new paradigm called patient controlled encryption. Li
et al. [25, 26] discussed how to implement the fine-grained data access control in multi-
owner settings of patient-centric PHRs by using attribute based encryption (ABE). Barua
et al. [5] also proposed a framework called ESPAC to handle the access control problem by
using ABE. Guo et al. [19] proposed a privacy-preserving attribute-based authentication
system for eHealth networks. Aleman et al. [3] reviewed carefully the literature on EHRs
and discussed the current research state on security and privacy on E-health systems.
IBE scheme. Here we start by recalling the IBE and FIBE schemes closely related to our
work. At Crypto’01, Boneh and Franklin constructed the first practical identity based
encryption based on bilinear groups [8] (BF IBE). In 2003, Sakai and Kasahara pro-
posed a new identity based encryption with diﬀerent structure based on bilinear groups
(SK IBE) [40]. However, both of these works proved their security in the random oracle
model. At Eurocrypt’04, Boneh and Boyen proposed two new eﬃcient selective identity
secure IBE schemes without random oracles (BB1 IBE and BB2 IBE) [9]. Later Boneh and
Boyen [10], Waters [44] improved their work on IBE schemes with full security at Crypto’04
and Eurocrypt’05 (Waters’ IBE). At Eurocrypt’06, Gentry proposed an eﬃcient identity
based encryption with tight security proof in the standard model but based on a strong
assumption (Gentry’s IBE) [18]. All the existing IBEs are based on three frameworks: “Full
Domain Hash” framework, “ Exponent Inversion” framework and “Communicative Blind-
ing” framework [11]. “Full Domain Hash” framework includes BF IBE, which is proven
secure in the random oracle and supports hierarchies and threshold variants. “Exponent
Inversion” framework includes SK IBE, BB2 IBE and Gentry’s IBE, which are always diﬃ-
cult to support extensions. “Communicative Blinding” framework includes BB1 IBE and
Waters’ IBE, which always support extensions like hierarchy IBE, threshold IBE, fuzzy IBE,
attribute based encryption and broadcast encryption.
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IBPRE scheme. In ACNS’07, Green and Ateniese proposed the first identity based proxy
re-encryption schemes [17]. They defined the algorithms and security models for identity
based proxy re-encryption, and constructed their scheme by using a variant of the eﬃcient
Dodis/Ivan key splitting approach to settings with a bilinear map. The re-encryption key
in their scheme is of the form (H1(Alice)−s· H(X), IBEBob(X)). When the proxy re-encrypts,
it does some transformations and sends IBEBob(X) to the delegatee. And then, the del-
egatee decrypts IBEBob(X) to recover X and uses this X to recover the original message.
In ISC’07, Chu and Tzeng proposed the first IND-CCA2 secure proxy re-encryption in
the standard model based on Waters’ IBE [13]. They followed the paradigm proposed
in [17] (denoted here it as Green’s paradigm). Unfortunately, Shao et al. found their
scheme cannot achieve IND-CCA2 secure and they fixed this flaw by proposing an im-
proved scheme [39]. However, both of these schemes are not eﬃcient due to the structure
of Waters’ IBE and Green’s paradigm. In Pairing’07, Matsuo proposed four types of
proxy re-encryption: IBE to IBE, CBE to IBE, IBE to CBE and CBE to CBE. They con-
structed a hybrid proxy re-encryption scheme from CBE to IBE and a proxy re-encryption
scheme from IBE to IBE. But recently it was shown that their proxy re-encryption scheme
from IBE to IBE has some flaws [46]. In Inscrypt’08, Tang et al. proposed the new
concept of inter-domain identity based proxy re-encryption [43]. They were concerned
on constructing proxy re-encryption between diﬀerent domains in identity based setting.
They follow Green’s paradigm but based on Boneh-Frankin IBE. Their scheme can only
achieve IND-sID-CPA secure. Later, Ibraimi et al. construct a type and identity based
proxy re-encryption, which aimed at combing type and identity properties in one proxy
re-encryption system [21]. Recently, Lai et al. [29] gave new constructions on IBPRE
based on identity-based mediated encryption. Luo et al. [30] also gave a new generic
IBPRE construction based on IBE. Wang et al. proposed the first multi-use CCA-secure
unidirectional IBPRE scheme [45]. Until now, although there are some proposals on how
to achieve attribute based proxy re-encryption, but there is almost no work on how to
achieve fuzzy IBPRE scheme.
1.3. Paper’s Organization
In Section 2, we give some preliminaries, including the assumptions, definitions and
security models. In Section 3, we present the overview on our E-health system model,
propose our schemes and analyse their security. In Section 5, we give the performance
analysis on our proposed IBPRE scheme, which is a critical part of our E-health system.
Finally, we conclude our paper in the last Section 6.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Bilinear Groups
Let G be an algorithm called a group generator that takes as input a security parameter
λ and outputs a tuple (G,GT , e) where G and GT are two cyclic groups of order p, and e
is a function e : G×G→ GT satisfying the following properties:
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• (Bilinear) ∀u, v ∈ G, ∀a, b ∈ Z,
e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab
• (Non-degenerate) ∃g ∈ G such that e(g, g) has order p in GT .
We assume that the group action in G and GT as well as the bilinear map e are all
computable in polynomial time in λ. Furthermore, we assume that the description of G
and GT includes a generator of G and GT respectively.
2.2. EXDBDH1 Assumption
EXDBDH1 assumption extends the DBDH assumption in the prime order bilinear
group.
Definition 1. Run G to obtain (G,GT , e). Next it generates g as generators of G. On
input (g, ga, gb, gc,
g(b+c)d, gd, T ), for any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A cannot distinguish T =
e(g, g)abd from a random element in G with non-negligible probability, this is the EXDBDH2
assumption.
We note that the assumption is a falsifiable assumption [32]. Intuitively, there is no
gab, gad, gbd, hence the pairing cannot help to solve the decisional problem.
2.3. Definition and Security Notion for IBE
An IBE scheme consists of the following algorithms.
Setup(1k). On input a security parameter, outputs both the master public parameters
params which are distributed to users, and the master key msk which is kept private.
KeyGen(msk, params, ID). On input an identity ID ∈ {0, 1}∗ and the master secret
key msk, outputs a decryption key skID corresponding to that identity.
Encrypt(ID, params, m). On input a set of public parameters, an identity ID ∈ {0, 1}∗
and a plaintext m ∈ M , outputs CID, the encryption of m under the specified
identity.
Decrypt(skID, params, CID). Decrypts the ciphertext CID using the secret key skID,
and outputs m or ⊥.
We recall the IND-sID-CPA security in [9]. It is defined using the following game:
Init: The adversary outputs an identity ID∗ where it wishes to be challenged.
Setup: The challenger runs the Setup algorithm. It gives the adversary the resulting
system parameters params. It keeps the master key to itself.
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Phase1: The adversary issues q1 · · · qm where qi is one of private key query IDi where
IDi ̸= ID∗. The challenger responds by running algorithm KeyGen to generate the
private key di corresponding to the public key IDi. It sends di to the adversary.
These queries maybe asked adaptively, that is, each query qi may depend on the
replies to q1, · · · , qi−1.
Challenge: Once the adversary decides that Phase1 is over it outputs two equal length
plaintexts M0,M1 ∈ M on which it wishes to be challenged. The challenger picks a
random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and sets the challenge ciphertext to C = Encryption(params, ID∗,Mb).
It sends C as the challenge to the adversary.
Phase2: The adversary issues additional queries qm+1 · · · qn where qi is one of private
key queries IDi where IDi ̸= ID∗. The challenger responds as in Phase1. These
queries maybe asked adaptively as in Phase1.
Guess: Finally, the adversary outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1}. The adversary wins if b = b′.
We refer to such an adversary A as an IND-sID-CPA adversary. We define the advantage of
the adversary A in attacking the scheme E as Advϵ,Aa =| Pr[b = b′]− 12 |, The probability
is over the random bits used by the challenger and the adversary. If this probability is
negligible, then we say scheme E is IND-sID-CPA secure.
2.4. Definition and Security Notion for IBPRE
An identity based (single-hop) proxy re-encryption scheme consists of the algorithms
(Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt, ReKeygen, Reencrypt):
Setup(1k). On input a security parameter, outputs both the master public parameters
params, which are distributed to users, and the master key msk which is kept private.
KeyGen(params, msk, ID). On input an identity ID ∈ {0, 1}∗ and the master secret
key msk, outputs a decryption key skID corresponding to that identity.
Encrypt(params, ID, m). On input a set of public parameters, an identity ID ∈ {0, 1}∗
and a plaintext m ∈ M , outputs the second level ciphertext CID, which can be re-
encrypted by the proxy.
ReKeygen(params, skID1, ID2). On input secret key skID1 , and identities ID2 ∈
{0, 1}∗, the delegator non-interactively generates the re-encryption key rkID1→ID2
and outputs it.
Reencrypt(params, rkID1→ID2, CID1). On input a second level ciphertext CID1 under
identity ID1, and a re-encryption key rkID1→ID2, outputs a first level re-encrypted
ciphertext CID2 which can not be re-encrypted.
Decrypt2(params, skID, CID). On input a second level ciphertext CID under identity
ID with secret key skID, decrypts the ciphertext CID, and outputs m or ⊥.
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Decrypt1(params, skID, CID). On input a first level re-encrypted ciphertext CID under
identity ID with secret key skID, decrypts the re-encrypted ciphertext CID, and
outputs m or ⊥.
Correctness: Intuitively, an IBPRE is correct if the Decrypt algorithm always outputs
the expected decryption of a properly generated ciphertext. Slightly more formally,
let cID1 ← Encrypt(params, ID1, m) be a properly generated ciphertext, Then ∀m ∈
M, ∀ID1, ID2 ∈ {0, 1}∗, where skID1 = KeyGen(msk, ID1), skID2 = KeyGen(msk, ID2),
rkID1→ID2 ← ReKeygen(params, skID1, ID1, ID2), the following propositions hold:
• Decrypt(params, skID1, cID1)= m
• Decrypt(params, skID2, Reencrypt(params, rkID1→ID2, cID1))=m
IND-ID-CCA Security for the Second Level Ciphertext.. IND-ID-CCA Security for the sec-
ond level ciphertext is defined according to the following game.
Setup. Run Setup(1k) to get (params, msk), and give params to A.
Find phase. A makes the following queries. At the conclusion of this phase A will select
ID∗ ∈ {0, 1}∗ and (m0, m1) ∈M2.
1. ForA’s queries to extract oracleOextract with (extract, ID), return skID =KeyGen(
params, msk, ID) to A.
2. ForA’s queries to re-encryption key extract oracleOrkextract with (rkextract, ID1, ID2),
where ID1 ̸= ID2, return rkID1→ID2=ReKeygen(params,KeyGen(params,msk, ID1), ID2)
to A.
3. For A’s queries to re-encrypt oracle Oreencrypt with (reencrypt, ID1, ID2, C),
derive a re-encryption key rkID1→ID2 = ReKeygen(params,KeyGen(params,msk, ID1), ID2),
and return C ′=Reencrypt(params, rkID1→ID2, ID1, ID2, C) to A.
4. ForA’s queries to the first level ciphertext decrypt oracleO1decrypt with (decrypt, ID,C)
where C is a first level ciphertext, returnm = Decrypt1(params,KeyGen(params,msk,
ID),C) to A.
Note that A is not permitted to choose ID∗ such that trivial decryption is possible
using keys extracted during this phase (e.g., by using extracted re-encryption keys
to translate from ID∗ to some identity for which A holds a decryption key). Also
note that the second level ciphertext decrypt oracle O2decrypt is no use here, for any
second level ciphertext can be first re-encrypted and then be queried to the O1decrypt
to get the decryption result.
Choice and Challenge. When A presents (choice, ID∗, m0, m1), choose i←R {0, 1}, com-
pute C∗= Encrypt(params, ID∗, mi) and give C∗ to A.
Guess stage. A continues to make queries as in the find stage, with the following restric-
tions. Let C = (C∗, ID∗). For all rk given to A, let C′ be the set of all possible values
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derived via calls to Reencrypt oracle, e.g. on successful execution of re-encrypt query
(reencrypt, ID∗, ID′, C∗), let C ′ be the result and add the pair (C ′, ID′) to the set
C′. We call C ∪ C′) is the Derivative of (C∗, ID∗).
1. A is not permitted to issue any query of the form (decrypt, ID,C) to decrypt
oracle O1decrypt or O2decrypt where (C, ID) ∈ (C ∩ C′).
2. A is not permitted to issue any queries (ex−tract, ID) to extract oracle Oextract
or (rk − extract, ID1, ID2) to re-encryption key extract oracle Orkextract that
would permit trivial decryption of any ciphertext in (C,C ′).
3. A is not permitted to issue any query of the form (reencrypt, ID1, ID2, C)
to re-encrypt oracle Oreencrypt where A possesses the keys to trivially decrypt
ciphertexts under ID2 and (C, ID1) ∈ (C ∩ C′).
At the conclusion of this stage, A outputs i′, where i′ ∈ {0, 1}.
The outcome of the game is determined as follows: If i′ = i then A wins the game.
Let Adv=| Pr(i′ = i) − 1/2 |. If for all probabilistic polynomial time algorithms A,
Adv ≤ v(k), we say that the IBPRE scheme S is IND-ID-CCA secure for the second level
ciphertext.
IND-ID-CCA Security for the First Level Ciphertext.. IND-ID-CCA Security for the first
level ciphertext is defined according to the following game.
Setup. Run Setup(1k) to get (params, msk), and give params to A.
Find phase. A makes the following queries. At the conclusion of this phase A will select
(ID⋆, ID∗) ∈ {0, 1}∗ and (m0, m1) ∈M2.
1. For A’s queries to extract oracle Oextract with (extract, ID), return skID =Key-
Gen
(params, msk, ID) to A.
2. ForA’s queries to re-encryption key extract oracleOrkextract with (rkextract, ID1, ID2),
where ID1 ̸= ID2, return rkID1→ID2=ReKeygen(params,KeyGen(params,msk, ID1), ID2)
to A.
3. ForA’s queries to the first level ciphertext decrypt oracleO1decrypt with (decrypt, ID,C),
return m = Decrypt1(params,KeyGen(params,msk, ID),C) to A.
Note here that A is permitted to get all the extracted re-encryption keys including
ID∗ to some identity for which A holds a decryption key. Also note here that the
re-encrypt oracle and second level ciphertext decrypt oracle are useless, since the A
knows all the re-encryption key, he can do all the re-encryption and transform the
second level ciphertext to the first level ciphertext.
Choice and Challenge. When A presents (choice, ID⋆, ID∗, m0, m1), choose i←R {0, 1},
compute C⋆= Encrypt(params, ID∗,mi) and C∗=Reencrypt(params, rkID∗→ID⋆, ID⋆, ID∗, C⋆)
give C⋆ to A.
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Guess stage. A continues to make queries as in the find stage, with the following restric-
tions.
1. A is not permitted to issue any query of the form (decrypt, ID∗, C∗) to decrypt
oracle O1decrypt or (decrypt, ID⋆, C⋆) to O2decrypt. Note here that C⋆ maybe can
be derived from C∗.
2. A is not permitted to issue any queries (extract, ID⋆) or (extract, ID∗) to
extract oracle Oextract.
At the conclusion of this stage, A outputs i′, where i′ ∈ {0, 1}.
The outcome of the game is determined as follows: If i′ = i then A wins the game.
Let Adv=| Pr(i′ = i) − 1/2 |. If for all probabilistic polynomial time algorithms A,
Adv ≤ v(k), we say that the IBPRE scheme S is IND-ID-CCA secure for the first level
ciphertext.
Remark 1. In this security notion, we give two target identities (ID∗, ID⋆) for our re-
encryption not randomizing the second level ciphertext. From the the re-encrypted first
level ciphertext, anyone can trivially derive its second level ciphertext.
Master Secret Security.. We extend Libert and Vergnaud’s definition on master secret
security of PRE [24], to IBPRE. This notion demands that no coalition of dishonest
delegatees be able to pool their re-encryption keys in order to expose the private key of
their common delegator. More formally, the following probability should be negligible as
a function of the security parameter λ1,
Pr[skID⋆ ← Oextract(ID⋆),
skIDx ← Oextract(IDx)},
{RID⋆→IDx ← Orkextract(ID⋆, IDx)},
{RIDx→ID⋆ ← Orkextract(IDx, ID⋆)},
γ ← A(ID⋆, {IDx, skIDx},
{RID⋆→IDx}, {RIDx→ID⋆}) : γ = skID⋆]
3. System Model
Here we overview the proposed system model in Fig. 4. In this system model, there
are four parties playing diﬀerent roles: the patients, the physician group, the community
health service group and the cloud. We can roughly describe the system as the following:
1Notations: (ID⋆, skID⋆) denotes the target user’s identity and private key and (IDx, skIDx) denotes
the colluding user’s identity and private key.
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Figure 4: Our Proposed System Model
1. The system first setup the parameters and generate the public/secret keys for diﬀer-
ent parties. Here, the whole system runs in an identity based setting. All the users
in the system including the patients, the physician group, the community health
service group, all need to publish their identities as the public key, and they will ob-
tain their secret keys corresponding to their identities via the IBE’s Key Generation
algorithm.
2. The patients or the physician group or the community health service group, first
encrypt the EHRs using block ciphers like AES using block cipher key, then they
encrypt the block cipher key using the target receivers’ identities as the public
keys (including their own identities), via the IBE’s Encrypt algorithm, finally they
outsource the ciphertexts corresponding to the EHRs or the keys to the cloud.
3. The patients, the physician group and the community health service group can
retrieve the related ciphertexts from the cloud, and then recover the block cipher
key from the ciphertexts via the IBE’s Decrypt algorithm, finally they can recover
the EHRs by using AES’s decryption algorithm.
4. Suppose one day a patient Alice has been given a diagnosis by the physician group
R, and she encrypted her own EHRs under the physician group R’s identities. But
after that, some day when she is at home, she has a health trouble and wants the
community health service group T can give her some assistance. If the community
health service group T can have Alice’s old EHRs, then this will greatly reduce their
workload on the new diagnosis.
5. For easily obtaining Alice’s old EHRs, the physician group R and the community
health service group T have better to establish a proxy re-encryption mechanism
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between them. Considering the setting in our system model, it is better to have
an IBPRE mechanism. To smoothly run this mechanism, R need first generate the
re-encryption key by using its own private key and T ’s identities, via running the
ReKeyGen algorithm of IBPRE. Then R sends it to the proxy which is a semi-honest
party which could be the cloud itself.
6. After obtaining the re-encryption requirement of the community health service group
T , the proxy (or the cloud) can implement the re-encryption and forward the re-
encrypted ciphertexts to the community health service group T . T then uses its
own secret key to decrypt the re-encrypted ciphertext to obtain the patient T ’s
EHRs.
Here we describe the security objectives of our E-health system model.
1. For the patients, the physician group, and the community health service group, their
encrypted EHRs need to be kept confidential for the adversary, thus the ciphertexts
should achieve IND-ID-CPA or IND-ID-CCA security, that is, the ciphertexts should
be indistinguishable for the adversary under chosen plaintext attack or chosen ci-
phertext attack.
2. For the physician group, which runs the proxy re-encryption mechanism, its secret
key should not be derived by the proxy and the delegatee which is the community
health service group, thus the IBPREmechanism should achieve master secret secure.
Its normal ciphertexts and re-encrypted ciphertexts should be also kept confidential
for the adversaries including the cloud, the proxy etc, thus IBPRE should achieve
IND-ID-CPA or IND-ID-CCA security.
4. Proposed Schemes and Security Analysis
4.1. New Identity Based Encryption
1. Setup(1k). Run G(1n) to obtain (G,GT , e). Next it generates g as generators of
bilinear group of G with order p. For now, we assume public keys (ID) are elements
in ZZ∗p. We also assume messages to be encrypted are elements in GT . Select random
t1, t2, t3 ∈ ZZ∗p, let g2 = gt1 , g3 = gt3, h = gt2. Pick a random α ∈ ZZ∗p, set g1 = gα,
that is,
params = (g, g1, g2, g3, h, p,G,GT , e),
msk = (α, t1, t2, t3)
2. KeyGen(msk,params, ID). Given msk = (α, t1, t2, t3) and ID with params, the
PKG picks random x, y, n ∈ ZZ∗p and sets
dID = (d1, d2, d3, d4)
= (
α + x
αID + t2
+ y mod p, gx(gID1 h)
y, gx3 (g
ID
1 h)
−n, gy3g
n)
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3. Encrypt(ID,params,M). To encrypt a message M ∈ GT under the public key
ID ∈ ZZ∗p, pick a random r ∈ ZZ∗p and compute
CID = (C1, C2, C3, C4) = (g
r, (g2g3)
r, (gID1 h)
r,Me(g1, g2)
r)
4. Decrypt(skID,params,CID). Given ciphertext CID = (C1, C2, C3, C4) and the
secret key dID = (d1, d2, d3) with params, compute
M =
C4e(C2, d2)
e(g2, C
d1
3 )e(C1, d3)e(C3, d4)
Correctness:
M ′ =
C4e(C2, d2)
e(g2, C
d1
3 )e(C1, d3)e(C3, d4)
=
Me(g1, g2)re((g2g3)r, gx(gID1 h)
y)
e(g2, ((gID1 h)
r)(
α+x
αID+t2
+y))e(gr, gt3x(gID1 h)
−n)
· 1
e((gID1 h)
r, gt3ygn)
=
Me(g1, g2)re((g2g3)r, gx(gID1 h)
y)
e(g2, ((gID1 h)
r)y)e(g2, gxr)e(g2, gr1)e(g
r
3, g
x(gID1 h)
y)
=
Me(g1, g2)re(g2, (gx(gID1 h)
y)r)
e(g2, ((gID1 h)
r)y)e(g2, gxr)e(g2, gr1)
=
Me(g1, g2)re(g2, ((gID1 h)
y)r)
e(g2, ((gID1 h)
r)y)e(g2, gr1)
=
Me(g1, g2)r
e(g2, gr1)
= M
Here we compare our IBE scheme with some other existing IBE schemes, the results
can be seen in Table 1. From this table we can see that our scheme is the most eﬃcient
for the re-encryption process, furthermore the security proof of our scheme is novel com-
pared with the famous BF, BB1 and BB2 IBE. Our scheme can simulate the private key
generation without knowing the master key α, as we rely on a denominator/numerator
form technique to simulate the secret key generation, the concrete techniques can be seen
in the below subsection. Furthermore, although our scheme can only be proved IND-CPA
secure, it can be easily extended to be CCA-secure by using known techniques. We em-
phasise here that IND-CPA security in some cases is enough for E-health systems, for
these systems are often organized in a closed environment and thus the users of them are
often semi-trusted or trusted.
4.2. Security Analysis for IBE
Theorem 1. Suppose the EXDBDH1 assumption holds in (G,GT , e), then our proposed
IBE is IND-sID-CPA secure.
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Table 1: Feature Comparison
Scheme W.R.O. Eﬃcient for re-encryption Security proof technique
BF [8] No No Random Oracle Model
BB1 [9] Yes No Simulating without gα
BB2 [9] Yes No Simulating without gα
Ours Yes Yes Simulating without α
Proof. Suppose A can attack our scheme, we construct an algorithm B solves the
EXDBDH problem in (G,GT , e). On input (g, ga, gb, gc, g(b+c)d, gd, T ), algorithm B’s goal
is to output 1 if T = e(g, g)abd and 0 otherwise. Let g1 = ga, g2 = gb, g3 = gc, that is,
t1 = a, t2 = b, t3 = c. Algorithm B works by interacting with A in a selective identity
game as follows:
Initialization. The selective identity game begins with A first outputting an identity
ID∗ that it intends to attack.
Setup. To generate the system’s parameters, algorithm B picks α′ ∈ ZZ∗p at random and
defines h = g−ID
∗
1 g
α′ ∈ G. It gives A the parameters params = (g, g1, g2, g3, h).
Note that the corresponding master key, which is unknown to B, is a.
Phase 1. A issues up to private key query on ID. B returns
dsim1 =
1
(ID − ID∗) + y mod p
=
a+ x
aID − aID∗ + α′ + y mod p
=
a+ x
aID + t2
+ y mod p
dsim2 = (g)
( α
′
ID−ID∗ )(ga)y(ID−ID
∗)(g)y
= gx(ga(ID−ID
∗)g)y = gx(gID1 h)
y
dsim3 = (g
c)(
α′
ID−ID∗ )((ga)ID−ID
∗
gα
′
)−n
= gcx(gID1 h)
−n = gx3 (g
ID
1 h)
−n
dsim4 = (g
c)ygn = gy3g
n
where x = α
′
ID−ID∗ mod p and y, n randomly chosen from ZZ
∗
p. We can verify
(dsim1 , · · · , dsim4 ) is a valid private key for ID.
Challenge. When A decides that Phase 1 is over, it outputs two messages M0,M1 ∈
G. Algorithm B picks a random bit b and responds with the ciphertext C =
(gd, g(b+c)d, (gα′)d,Mb · T ). Hence if T = e(g, g)abd, then C is a valid encryption
of Mb under ID∗. Otherwise, C is independent of b in the adversary’s view.
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Phase 2. A issues private key query on IDi as he does in Phase 1 except IDi = ID∗.
Guess. Finally, A outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1}. Algorithm B concludes its own game by
outputting a guess as follows. If b = b′, then B outputs 1 meaning T = e(g, g)abd.
Otherwise it outputs 0 meaning T ̸= e(g, g)abd.
When T = e(g, g)abd then A’s advantage for breaking the scheme is the same as B’s
advantage for solving EXDBDH problem.
4.3. New Identity Based Proxy Re-encryption
1. Setup(1k). Run G(1n) to obtain (G,GT , e) with G. Next it generates g as gener-
ators of G. It chooses a one time signature scheme S and an IND-CCA2 symmetric
encryption SE. It also chooses three hash functions G : {0, 1}∗ → ZZ∗p2, H1 : S→ G
where S is the one time signature scheme’s public key svk’s space, H2 : GT → K
where K is the SE’s key space. We also assume messages to be encrypted are ele-
ments in GT . Select random α, t1, t2, t3 and compute (g1, g2, g3, h) as the same as
those in our IBE scheme, select random s, s′ ∈ ZZp and compute A = gs, that is
params = (g, g1, g2, g3, h, A, p,G,GT , e, H,H1, H2, G, SE,S),
msk = (α, s, s′, t1, t2, t3)
2. KeyGen(msk,params, ID). Given msk = (α, t1, t2, t3) and ID with params, the
PKG picks random x, y, x′, y′, N, n, n′, z ∈ ZZ∗p, computes uID = sG(ID) and outputs
the private key skID associated with ID
skID = (d
A
ID, d
B
ID, d
C
ID)
dAID = (d1, d2, d3, d4, d5, d6)
= (
α+ x
αID + t2
+ y mod p, gx(gID1 h)
y,
gx3 (g
ID
1 h)
−N , gy3g
N , Aygn, Ax(gID1 h)
−n)
dBID = (d
′
1, d
′
2, d
′
3)
= (
t2 + x′
αID + t2
+ y′ mod p, Ay
′
gn
′
, Ax
′
(gID1 h)
−n′gs
′
)
dCID = (d7, d8)
= (gα2 (g
ID
1 h)
uIDgzG(ID), gzG(ID)gs
′G(ID))
3. Encrypt(ID,params,M). To encrypt a message M ∈ GT under the public key
ID ∈ ZZ∗p, pick a random r ∈ ZZ∗p, a one time signature instance with public/private
keys (svk, ssk), compute
CID = (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, C7)
= (gr, (g2g3)
r, (gID1 h)
r, SE.Enc(H2(e(g1, g2)
r),M), H1(svk)
r, svk, σ)
where σ = S.sig(ssk, C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6).
2G maps the identity to ZZ∗p which can be used to identify diﬀerent IBE users.
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4. ReKeygen(dID,params, ID′). Choose randomly k3 ∈ ZZ∗p, generate the re-encryption
key rkID→ID′ as following
rkID→ID′ = (rk1, rk2, rk3, rk4)
rk1 =
1
k3
(d1 · ID′ + d′1) mod p
=
1
k3
(
(αID′ + xID′ + t2 + x′)
αID + t2
+ yID′ + y′) mod p
=
(αID′ + t2 + k1)
k3(αID + t2)
+ k2 mod p
rk2 = A
k3·G(ID′) = gk3·s·G(ID
′) = gk3uID′
rk3 = (d
ID′
5 d
′
2)
G(ID′) = g(s·(yID
′+y′)+(nID′+n′))·G(ID′)
= gs·(yID
′+y′)·G(ID′)g(nID
′+n′)G(ID′)
= gk2k3uID′g(nID
′+n′)G(ID′)
rk4 = (d
ID′
6 d
′
3)
G(ID′)
=
gs·(xID′+x′)·G(ID′)gs′G(ID′)
(gID1 h)
(nID′+n′)G(ID′)
where
k1 = xID
′ + x′, k2 =
yID′ + y′
k3
5. Reencrypt(rkID→ID′ ,params,CID, ID′). Given ciphertext CID = (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, C7),
first check CID’s validity:
S.Verify(C6, C7) = Yes, e(g, C5) = e(C1, H1(C6))
if these conditions are not satisfied, then return ⊥, else compute
ĈID′ = (C
′
1, C
′
2, C
′
3, C
′
4, C
′
5, C
′
6, C
′
7)ID′
= (C1, C2, C3, C4, e(C
rk1
3 , rk2), rk3, rk4)
6. Decrypt2(skID,params,CID). Given ciphertext CID = (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, C7)
and the secret key skID = (dAID, d
B
ID, d
C
ID) where d
A
ID = (d1, d2, d3) with params, first
check CID’s validity:
S.Verify(C6, C7) = Yes, e(g, C5) = e(C1, H1(C6))
if these conditions can not be satisfied, then return ⊥, else compute
K = H2(
e(g2, C
d1
3 )e(C1, d3)e(C3, d4)
e(C2, d2)
),
M = SE.Dec(K,C4)
and finally check M ’s validity by using SE’s IND-CCA2 property.
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7. Deccrypt1(skID,params, ĈID). Given the re-encrypted ciphertext ĈID = (C ′1, C
′
2, C
′
3, C
′
4, C
′
5,
C ′6, C
′
7)ID with d
C
ID = (d7, d8) with params, decrypt the re-encrypted ciphertext as
K = H2(
e(C ′3, C
′
6)e(C
′
1, C
′
7)e(C
′
1, d7)
C ′5e(C ′2, d8)
),
M = SE.Dec(K,C ′3)
and finally check M ’s validity by using SE’s IND-CCA2 property.
Correctness: Assume the re-encrypted ciphertext is ĈID = (C ′1, C
′
2, C
′
3, C
′
4, C
′
5, C
′
6, C
′
7)ID,
which results from re-encrypting from IDx to ID by using rkIDx→ID. We can verify the
correctness of Deccrypt1(skID, params, ĈID) as following
T =
e(C ′3, C
′
6)e(C
′
1, C
′
7)e(C
′
1, d7)
C ′5e(C ′2, d8)
=
e(C ′3, rk3)e(C
′
1, rk4)e(C
′
1, d7)
C ′5e(C ′2, d8)
=
e((gIDx1 h)
r, guIDk2k3g(nID+n
′)G(ID))
e(gk3uID , (gIDx1 h)
r(
αID+t2+k1
k3(αIDx+t2)
+k2)
)
·
e(gr, g
k1uIDgs
′G(ID′)
(gIDx1 h)
(nID+n′)G(ID) )e(g
r, gα2 (g
ID
1 h)
uIDgzG(ID))
e(gr, (gzgs′)G(ID))
=
e((gIDx1 h)
r, guIDk2k3g(nID+n
′)G(ID))
e(gr, (gIDx1 h)
(nID+n′)G(ID))
· 1
e(gk3uID , (gIDx1 h)
r(
αID+t2+k1
k3(αIDx+t2)
+k2)
)
· e(g
r, gk1uID)e(gr, gs
′G(ID))e(gr, gα2 (g
ID
1 h)
uIDgzG(ID))
e(gr, gzG(ID))e(gr, gs′G(ID))
=
e((gIDx1 h)
r, guIDk2k3)e(gr, gk1uID)
e(gk3uID , (gIDx1 h)
k2r)e(gk3uID , (gID1 h)
r
k3 )
= e(gα2 , g
r)
e(gα2 (g
ID
1 h)
uID , gr)e(gzG(ID), gr)
e(gk3uID , g
k1r
k3 )e(gr, gzG(ID))
K = H2(T ), M = SE.Dec(K,C
′
3)
4.4. Security Analysis for IBPRE
Theorem 2. Suppose the EXDBDH assumption holds in (G,GT , e), SE is IND-CCA2
secure and S is strongly unforgeable, then our IBPRE scheme is IND-sID-CCA2 secure for
the second level ciphertext.
Proof. Suppose A can attack our scheme, we construct an algorithm B (or simulator
B) solves the EXDBDH problem in (G,GT , e).
Before describing B, we first define an event FOTS and bound its probability to occur.
Let C∗ = (C∗1 , C
∗
2 , C
∗
3 , C
∗
4 , C
∗
5 , svk
∗, σ∗) denote the challenge ciphertext given to A in
the game. Let FOTS be the event that, A issues a decryption query for a re-encryption
query C∗ = (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, svk∗, σ) where (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5) = (C∗1 , C
∗
2 , C
∗
3 , C
∗
4 , C
∗
5)
but σ ̸= σ∗ and S.Verify(σ, svk∗, (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5)) = Yes. In the “find” stage, A
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has simply no information on svk∗ . Hence, the probability of a pre-challenge occurrence
of F does not exceed qO · δ if qO is the overall number of oracle queries and δ denotes
the maximal probability (which by assumption does not exceed 1/p) that any one-time
verification key svk is output by S. In the “guess” stage FOTS clearly gives rise to an
algorithm breaking the strong unforgeability of the one-time signature. Therefore, the
probability Pr[FOTS] ≤ qOp + AdvOTS3 must be negligible by assumption.
On input (g, ga, gb, gc, g(b+c)d, gd, T ), algorithm B’s goal is to output 1 if T = e(g, g)abd
and 0 otherwise. Let g1 = ga, g2 = gb, g3 = gc, that is, t1 = a, t2 = b, t3 = c. It chooses a
one time signature scheme S and an IND-CCA2 symmetric encryption SE. It also chooses
H,H1, H2, G as in the scheme. B works by interacting with A in a selective identity game
as follows:
Initialization.The selective identity game begins with A first outputting an identity
ID∗ that it intends to attack.
Setup. To generate the system’s parameters, algorithm B picks α′ ∈ ZZ∗p at ran-
dom and defines h = g−ID
∗
1 g
α′ ∈ G. It also picks random w, r, s′ ∈ ZZ∗p, defines
s = r − bw and A = gs = gr−bw = grgw2 . It gives A the parameters params =
(g, g1, g2, g3, h, A,H,H1, H2, G, SE,S). Note that the corresponding master key, which
is unknown to B, is a.
Phase 1.
3AdvOTS denotes the probability of breaking strong unforgeability of the one-time signature.
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1. A issues private key query on ID to Oextract. B returns
dsim1 =
1
(ID − ID∗) + y mod p
=
a + x
aID − aID∗ + α′ + y mod p
=
a+ x
aID + t2
+ y mod p
dsim2 = (g)
( α
′
ID−ID∗ )(ga)y(ID−ID
∗)(g)y
= gx(ga(ID−ID
∗)g)y = gx(gID1 h)
y
dsim3 = (g
c)(
α′
ID−ID∗ )((ga)ID−ID
∗
gα
′
)−N
= gcx(gID1 h)
−N = gx3 (g
ID
1 h)
−N
dsim4 = (g
c)ygN = gy3g
N
dsim5 = A
ygn,
dsim6 = A
α′
ID−ID∗ gα
′
)−n((ga)ID−ID
∗
gα
′
)−n
= Ax(gID1 h)
−n
d′sim1 =
−ID∗
(ID − ID∗) + y
′ mod p
=
a(−ID∗) + α′ + aID + x′
aID + α′ − aID∗ + y
′ mod p
d′sim2 = A
y′gn
′
,
d′sim3 = A
(−ID∗)α′
ID−ID∗ −α′((ga)ID−ID
∗
gα
′
)−n
′
gs
′
= Ax
′
(gID1 h)
−n′gs
′
dsim7 = (g
b)−α
′wG(ID)((ga)(ID−ID
∗)gα
′
)
rG(ID)
gz
′G(ID)
= g−α
′wG(ID)
2 (g
(ID−ID∗)
1 g
α′)
rG(ID)
gz
′G(ID)
= ga(ID−ID
∗)wG(ID)
2 (g
(ID−ID∗)
1 g
α′)
(r−bw)G(ID)
gz
′G(ID)
= ga2(g
(ID−ID∗)
1 g
α′)
(r−bw)G(ID)
·ga(ID−ID∗)wG(ID)−a+z′G(ID)
= ga2(g
ID
1 h)
sG(ID)
·ga(ID−ID∗)wG(ID)−a+z′G(ID)
= ga2(g
ID
1 h)
sG(ID)
gzG(ID)
dsim8 = (g
a)((ID−ID
∗)wG(ID)−1)gz
′G(ID)gs
′G(ID)
= ga(ID−ID
∗)wG(ID)−a+z′G(ID)gs
′G(ID)
= gzG(ID)gs
′G(ID)
where x = α
′
ID−ID∗ mod p, x
′ = (−ID
∗)α′
ID−ID∗ − α′ mod p, y, y′, N, n, n′, z′ randomly
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chosen from ZZ∗p, and z = a(ID − ID∗)w − aG(ID) + z′ holds. We can verify
(dsim1 , d
sim
2 , · · · , dsim8 ) is a valid private key for ID. We call this simulation as
“Normal Simulation”.
2. A issues rekey generation queries on (ID, ID′) to re-encryption key extract
oracle Orkextract.
(a) ID ̸= ID∗, in this case, ID′ can be any identity. The simulator B first
simulates KeyGen(msk, params, ID) as above and gets skID. Then it runs
ReKeygen(skID,
params, ID′), and returns the result rkID→ID′ to the adversary.
(b) ID = ID∗, in this case, ID′ can not be a corrupted identity. The simu-
lator B uses some other technique to generate the re-encryption key. The
simulator can generate the valid re-encryption key as following
dsim1 =
k
α′
+ y mod pn
=
a+ k − a
aID∗ + α′ − aID∗ + y mod p
dsim2 =
gk
(ga)
gα
′y
= gk−a(gα
′
)y = gx(gID
∗
1 h)
y
dsim3 =
(gc)k
gac
(gc)α
′y = gc(k−a)(gc)α
′y
= gt3(k−a)(gα
′
)
t3y
= gt3x(gID
∗
1 h)
t3y
dsim4 = A
ygn,
dsim5 = A
k−a(gID
∗−ID∗
1 g
α′)−n
= Ax(gID
∗−ID∗
1 g
α′)−n
d′sim1 =
α′ + k′
α′
+ y′ mod p
=
a(−ID∗) + α′ + aID∗ + k′
aID∗ + α′ − aID∗
+y′ mod p
d′sim2 = A
y′gn
′
d′sim3 = A
aID∗+k′gm
′
(g2g3)
s′
= Ax
′
gm
′
(g2g3)
s′
d′sim4 = (g
ID∗−ID∗
1 g
α′)n
′
gm
′
= (gα
′
)n
′
gm
′
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dsim7 = (g
b)−α
′wG(ID∗)
·((ga)(ID∗−ID∗)gα′)rG(ID∗)
·(gb)z′G(ID∗)(gac)((ID∗−ID∗)wG(ID∗)−1)
·(gc)z′G(ID∗)
= ga2(g
ID∗
1 h)
sG(ID∗)
(g2g3)
−a+z′G(ID∗)
= ga2(g
ID∗
1 h)
sG(ID∗)
(g2g3)
zG(ID∗)
dsim8 = (g
a)((ID
∗−ID∗)wG(ID∗)−1)
·gz′G(ID∗) = g−a+z′G(ID∗)
= gzG(ID
∗)
where x = k − a, x′ = aID∗ + k′, here k, k′, y, y′, n, n′, m,m′, z′ randomly
chosen from ZZ∗p, and z = − aG(ID∗) + z′ holds. After B generates private
key for ID∗, it runs ReKeygen(sksimID∗ , params,
ID′) with sksimID∗ , and returns the result rkID∗→ID′ to the adversary. We
call this simulation as “Special Simulation”.
3. A issues re-encryption queries on (CID, ID,
ID′) to re-encrypt oracle Oreencrypt. B first runs rkID→ID′ = ReKeygen(skID, params, ID′),
then runs Reencrypt(rkID→ID′, CID, ID, ID′) and returns the result to the ad-
versary.
4. A issues decryption queries on (ĈID′, ID′) to the first level ciphertext decrypt
oracle O1decrypt under the only condition (ĈID′, ID′) ̸= Derivative(C∗ID∗, ID∗)
where Derivative defined in 2.4.
(a) ID′ ̸= ID∗, B first simulates KeyGen(msk,
params, ID′) as in “Normal Simulation” 1, then runs Decrypt1(skID′, ĈID′)
and returns the result to the adversary.
(b) ID′ = ID∗, B first simulates KeyGen(msk,
params, ID∗) as in “Special Simulation” 2b, then runs Decrypt1(skID∗, ĈID∗)
and returns the result to the adversary.
Challenge. When A decides that Phase 1 is over, it outputs two messages M0,M1 ∈ G,
B picks a random bit b, a one time signature instance with public/private keys
(svk, ssk), and responds with the ciphertext C∗ = (C∗1 , C
∗
2 , C
∗
3 , C
∗
4 , C
∗
5 ,
C∗6 , C
∗
7) = (g
d, g(b+c)d, (gα′)d, SE.Enc
(T,Mb), H1(svk)
r, svk, σ) where σ = S(ssk, C∗1 ,
C∗2 , C
∗
3 , C
∗
4 , C
∗
5 , C
∗
6). Hence if T = e(g, g)
abd, then C∗ is a valid encryption of Mb
under ID∗. Otherwise, C∗ is independent of b in the adversary’s view.
Phase 2. A issues queries as he does in Phase 1 except natural constraints.
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Guess. Finally, A outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1}. Algorithm B concludes its own game by
outputting a guess as follows. If b = b′, then B outputs 1 meaning T = e(g, g)abd.
Otherwise it outputs 0 meaning T ̸= e(g, g)abd.
When T = e(g, g)abd thenA’s advantage is the same as B’s advantage for solving EXDBDH
problem.
Theorem 3. Suppose the EXDBDH assumption holds in (G,GT , e) and SE is IND-CCA2
secure, then our IBPRE scheme is IND-sID-CCA2 secure for the first level ciphertext.
Proof. Following the same idea in the proof of theorem 2, we can prove this theorem, ex-
cept this time the simulator needs to simulate re-encryption key on (ID∗, ID′) where ID′
is a corrupted identity. The simulator handles this query as following: it generates the pri-
vate key for ID∗ as in “Special Simulation” 2b. And runs ReKeygen(sksimID∗, params, ID
′)
with sksimID∗, returns the result to the adversary. Now even if the adversary gets the sim-
ulated private key for ID′ as in 1, it can not get any useful information from these keys
because they are independent with sksimID∗ , that is, (x, x
′, y, y′, n′, n′, z′)ID′ for any ID′ are
independent with (k, k′, y, y′, n, n′, z′)ID∗ .
We follow the way in [9] of using H(ID)4 instead of ID to achieve full security for our
IBPRE scheme.
Theorem 4. In the standard model, let E be our IBPRE scheme, if it is a (t, qs, ϵ)-selective
identity secure IBPRE system (IND-sID-CCA2). Suppose E admits N distinct identities.
Then E is also a (t, qs, Nϵ)-fully secure IBPRE (IND-ID-CCA2).
Proof. The proof is directly following the proof for the similar theorem in [9], we omit
it here due to space limitation.
Theorem 5. Suppose the EXDBDH assumption holds in (G,GT , e), SE is IND-CCA2
secure and S is strongly unforgeable, then our IBPRE scheme can achieve master secret
security.
Proof. As shown in [24], CCA2 security for the first level ciphertext implies the master
secret security, thus our IBPRE scheme can achieve master secret security.
Here we compare our IBPRE’s scheme’s security with other IBPRE schemes [17, 13, 31],
In Table 2, we denote W/O Random Oracle as with/without random oracle. Note here
Luo et al.’s IBPRE scheme is a generic construction, therefore their scheme can be in
random oracle and standard model, and the underlying assumption can be various, but
their generic construction is less eﬃcient than our scheme. Also note that our IBPRE’s
security also rely on the underlying symmetric encryption scheme’s IND-CCA2 security.
From the above table, we can conclude that our scheme is a new result on IBPRE. Our
scheme can achieve master secret secure and is based on a novel IBE while all previous
eﬃcient IBPRE schemes are based on the traditional IBE.
4The space of H(ID) is N .
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Table 2: IBPRE Security Comparison
Scheme Security W/O Random Oracle Assumption Master Secret Secure Underlying IBE
GA07A [17] IND-ID-CPA Random Oracle DBDH BF IBE
GA07B [17] IND-ID-CCA Random Oracle DBDH BF IBE
M07B [31] IND-ID-CPA Standard Model DBDH BB1 IBE
CT07 [13] IND-ID-CPA Standard Model DBDH Waters’ IBE
SXC08 [39] IND-ID-CCA Standard Model DBDH Waters’ IBE
LZD+10 [29] IND-ID-CCA Standard Model DBDH Waters’ IBE
WCW10 [45] IND-ID-CCA Random Oracle DBDH Variant of BF IBE
LHC10 [30] IND-ID-CPA Generic Generic Generic
Ours4.3 IND-ID-CCA Standard Model EXDBDH New IBE
4.5. Security Analysis of Our E-health System
Here we briefly show that our schemes satisfy the security objectives of the E-health
system.
1. For the patients, the physician group, and the community health service group,
they use our proposed IBE to encrypt the EHRs, thus can achieve IND-ID-CPA or
IND-ID-CCA security.
2. For the physician group which run the proxy re-encryption mechanism, his secret
key can not be derived by the proxy and the delegatee, for our IBPRE scheme can
achieve master secret security. His normal ciphertexts and re-encrypted ciphertexts
can also achieve IND-ID-CPA or IND-ID-CCA security, for our IBPRE scheme has
been proved IND-ID-CPA or IND-ID-CCA secure for the first level and the second
level ciphertexts.
5. Performance Analysis
In this section, we give our performance analysis, basically we concentrate on the
IBPRE’s performance, for it is the critical part of our E-health system, especially, the
re-encryption is the most used operation. Our IBE scheme are almost share the same
eﬃciency with existing BB1 or BB2 IBE. We compared our IBPRE with other IBPRE
schemes [17, 13, 31].
Notations: In Table 3, we denote Enc as encryption, Reenc as re-encryption, Dec as
decryption, Ciph as ciphertext and Ciph-Len as ciphertext length, tp, te and tme represent
the computational cost of a bilinear pairing, an exponentiation and a multi-exponentiation
respectively. tse, tsd and tsv represent the computational cost of once symmetric encryp-
tion, once symmetric decryption and once symmetric checking decryption results’ validity.
ts and tv represent the computational cost of a one-time signature signing and verifica-
tion respectively. |G| and |GT | denote the bit-length of an element in groups G and GT
respectively. Here Ge and GT are the prime order bilinear groups. |SE| denotes the bit
length of once symmetric encryption. Finally, |vk| and |s| denote the bit length of the
one-time signature’s public key and a one-time signature respectively.
Note here our first level ciphertext maps second level ciphertext and second level
ciphertext maps first level ciphertext in [17, 13]. Also note here GA07 and CT07 are
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multi-hop IBPRE schemes but we just consider their single-hop variant. Here we omit the
comparison between our IBPRE with SXC08 [39], LZD+10 [29], WCW10 [45], LHC10 [30]
schemes, for the following reasons: SXC08 [39], LZD+10 [29] schemes are based on Wa-
ters’ IBE, which make their schemes have large parameters; WCW10 [45] scheme can
not achieve master secret secure and is only proved secure in the random oracle model;
LHC10 [30] scheme is a generic construction.
Table 3: IBPRE Eﬃciency Comparison
Scheme Enc Check Reenc Dec Ciph-Len
1stCiph 2ndCiph 1stCiph 2ndCiph
GA07B [17] 1tp + 1te 2tp 2te + 2tp 1te + 2tp 2te + 2tp 1|G| + 1|Ge| 1|G| + 1|GT |
+2|m|+ |id| +1|Ge|+ |m|
LZD+10 [29] 5te 6tp 6te 24tp 8tp 13|G| + 1|GT | 4|G| + 1|GT |
WCW10 [45] 5te 4tp 2tp 1te + 2tp 1te + 4tp 2|G| + 1|GT | 4|G| + 1|GT |
+|m|+ |id| |id|+ |m|
Ours 4.3 2te + 2tme 1tv + 2tp te + tp 2tp + 1tsd 5tp + 1tsd 5|G| + 1|GT | 4|G| + 1|s|
+1ts + 1tse +1tsv +1|SE| +1|vk|+ 1|SE|
From the above table, we can conclude that our scheme seems to be a more directly
construction of IBPRE for its re-encryption key is operated on the exponent instead of
on the underlying group. Our scheme is particularly eﬃcient for the cloud, especially for
the IND-ID-CPA variant of our scheme. Compared with other IND-ID-CCA secure and
master secret secure IBPRE schemes [17, 29], our scheme also has the high eﬃciency for
the re-encryption process. Thus our scheme can greatly reduce the payment cost for the
whole E-health cloud system users.
To further demonstrate our scheme’s eﬃciency, we roughly evaluated its practical
performance. We give the performance comparison results for GA07B, LZD+, WCW
and Our schemes, according to the Benchmark of the famous JPBC library [4] based on
TestBed 1 (Intel(R) Core(TM)2 Quad CPU Q6600 @2.4GHZ, 3GB Ram, Ubuntu 10.04).
We have neglected some operations such as the computation cost of one-time symmetric
encryption, one-time symmetric decryption and one-time checking for the decryption re-
sults’ validity, one-time signature and verification. We choose type A pairings in JPBC
and using the pairing preprocessing technique. We get the following computation cost
comparison results from Figure 4,5,6,7,8, from which we can see our scheme is the most
eﬃcient scheme for checking and re-encryption process, while also remains among the
most eﬃcient ones for encryption, first level decryption and second level decryption. Note
the cloud implements lots of re-encryption process for data sharing among users of E-
health system, thus our scheme is the most eﬃcient one for the cloud and can achieve
cost-eﬀective compared with other schemes.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have discussed how to integrate the IBE, IBPRE identity related
techniques into a E-health cloud system to achieve its confidential property. We have
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Figure 5: Encryption cost Figure 6: Checking cost Figure 7: Re-encryption cost
Figure 8: First level decryption cost Figure 9: Second level decryption cost
presented the system model and show how to properly use these identity related primitives
to achieve the security objective. We have also proposed a new IBE scheme, which does not
rely in the IBE’s three frameworks [11]. The main novelty is the way we have embedded
the master key in the private key. We have proven this IBE is IND-sID-CPA secure in the
standard model based on a related DBDH assumption in the bilinear groups. Based on this
new IBE scheme, we have proposed a new IBPRE scheme, which is IND-ID-CCA2 secure,
eﬃcient for the proxy and master secret secure. Finally we have given the performance
analysis on the critical part of our E-health system, the IBPRE scheme. These results
showed the IBE, IBPRE identity related techniques are suitable for securing E-health
cloud systems.
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